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The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and 
Interrogation during Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 – 
April 2004. By Douglas A. Pryer, Fort Leavenworth: CGSC 
Foundation Press, 2009.  
 
Major Douglas Pryer's study of the U.S. Army's interrogation operations in 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM between May 2003 and April 2004 is the most 
difficult professional book I have ever read.  The difficulty lies not in Pryer's 
style. The Fight for the High Ground is lucid and clear.  Pryer's book details a 
descent into an amoral abyss by leaders from theater commanders to 
individual interrogators during OIF.  Pryer shows that poor leadership fueled 
by weak ethical reasoning led to abusive, ineffective interrogation resulting in 
strategic damage to the United States.  Pryer offers many illustrations of 
specific units and specific leaders who made bad decisions regarding 
interrogation operations.  These leaders based their ethical reasoning on ends 
justifying any means necessary and combined this with a total disregard for 
the interrogation doctrine in place at the time.  While Pryer illustrates many 
of the ambiguities in the 1992 U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52, he reserves his 
strongest criticism for leaders who authorized and encouraged practices that 
had no basis in doctrine, policy, or law and for which no soldiers were trained.   
 
Pryer first discusses abusive practices used at Guantanamo Bay and in 
Afghanistan, where interrogators who graduated from the Survival Evasion 
Resistance Escape (SERE) course began to implement SERE interrogation 
techniques into their questioning sessions.  These abusive practices migrated 
to Iraq when interrogators from Afghanistan or Guantanamo deployed there.  
He contrasts the unethical and abusive practices cited in the Church Report of 
August 2004 against the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 4th and 
101st Airborne Divisions with the practices and results obtained by the 
interrogators of the 1st AD in Baghdad.  
 
Despite command guidance from CJTF-7 to "take the gloves off" regarding 
interrogation, the senior leadership of the 1st Armored Division (1AD), 
beginning with its commanding general—Major General Martin Dempsey—
enforced strict adherence to current interrogation doctrine and Geneva 
Convention protections for all detainees.  So-called "enhanced interrogations" 
were never condoned within 1AD.  Subordinate leaders from brigade 
commanders to interrogation team leaders followed and reinforced Major 
General Dempsey's guidance.  These leaders realized that such practices 
degraded the moral standing of the United States, the credibility and moral 
character of the interrogator who practiced them, and were fundamentally 
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ineffective in obtaining reliable information.  As a result, 1AD substantiated 
only five incidents of interrogation abuse during OIF I.  Meanwhile, 1AD 
detainees provided a steady stream of valuable intelligence. 
 
Pryer identifies a number of systemic improvements to HUMINT operations 
based on 1AD successes, including the expansion of the 
Counterintelligence/HUMINT/Interrogation (2X) staff section of the 
command intelligence directorate and the emphasis on document (and later 
media) exploitation.  While other organizations recognized the necessity of 
expanding these capabilities, Major Pryer limits his focus to the units 
comprising the 1AD task force and contrasts their interrogation practices and 
results against the units cited in the Church Report.  
 
Pryer identifies several areas in which the Army quickly adapted both its 
structure and its doctrine to the current operating environment.  Some of the 
recommendations have been overtaken by events.  The Department of 
Defense no longer employs contractor interrogators and both national and 
service interrogation policy is under constant refinement.  Pryer focuses on 
shortfalls in ethical leadership and decision making regarding interrogation.  
He recommends improved and continuous training in both areas.  Pryer 
identifies the crucial weakness in the ethical training paradigm as the current 
Army Values themselves.  They are insufficient to deal with the complex 
ethical problems arising from war and better suited to "organizational 
efficacy" rather than a complex counterinsurgency.  
 
Current advanced interrogator training courses offered by the Fort Huachuca-
based HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence offer more expansive 
training on moral reasoning and the intersection of morality, ethics, and 
interrogation policy and doctrine.  Leaders must still ensure the humane 
treatment of detainees and scrupulous adherence to published standards of 
interrogation practice at all echelons.  This book will remind senior leaders 
and likely inform junior leaders how far we have come in the last nine years. 
 
Pryer's arguments are sound, and on controversial topics such as the degree 
to which military police should cooperate with interrogators he presents 
numerous contrasting opinions offered during the 2003-2004 period.  Pryer's 
assessment of improvements in practice and policy would be more complete if 
he had considered subsequent Army interrogation policy beyond the current 
Field Manual 2-22.3.  Additionally, he could have also considered the main 
DoD policy implanting the current interrogation field manual—DoD Directive 
3115.09, Intelligence Interrogation, Detainee Debriefing, and Tactical 
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Questioning, first published in 2005 and re-issued in 2008 and 2013.  All 
HUMINT soldiers need to be conversant with this policy as well as the Army 
Field Manual on interrogation. 
 
All HUMINT leaders from the collection team leader to the Military 
Intelligence brigade commander need to read The Fight For The High 
Ground.  Furthermore, maneuver battalion and brigade leaders should read 
the book so they do not repeat these mistakes.  The situations from this book 
should be incorporated as case studies for interrogation team leaders, 
HUMINT staff officers (2X), and S2s.  The effects of Major General Dempsey's 
command guidance on detainee treatment should be studied by brigade and 
division commanders.  Finally, future CGSC students should replicate Major 
Pryer's structure and study to cover additional units and phases of the Iraq 
and Afghanistan campaigns. 
 
For an earlier review of Major Pryer's work, consult Dr. Pete Mansoor's 
review in the July-August 2010 edition of Military Review.  COL Mansoor 
served as the 1st BCT/1AD commander during the period MAJ Pryer studied. 
 
Kevin S. Gould is a HUMINT Staff Officer for the Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army 
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